Make Hungary Great Again

For all of my life I have been a Hungarian. Today, I am an especially proud Hungarian.

12 April 2026. A fun fact about me: I’m a Hungarian citizen and could vote in the election that took place in Hungary today. I haven’t supported Viktor Orbán or Fidesz since his first victory on an anti-Soviet platform in the late 1980s. In my opinion, Orbán and his party, Fidesz, have become poster children for government corruption.

I also agree with many commentators that today’s victory by the Tisza party today serves as a stern warning shot across the bow of authoritarian-style governments in the EU, as well as in North and South America. Decades of campaigning and political rhetoric about improving people’s lives have created expectations that have gone unmet for quite some time in countries like Hungary (and, now, the United States).

But as someone who closely follows politics in Hungary, I urge some caution when it comes to predicting the future of the nation under new leadership. For example, Michelle Goldberg of The New York Times recently implied that incoming Prime Minister Péter Magyar of the Tisza Party could be viewed as a sort of small-‘d’ democrat.

While he has campaigned on an anti-corruption platform (and I have no reason to doubt that his convictions are genuine), Magyar is not a Democrat by American political standards. Based on my research on decision-making, one’s behavioral patterns say more about a person than the words they speak. So, my suggestion to all — myself included! — is to pay close attention to Magyar’s prior politics and choices. He has historically leaned right, though not (yet) to the degree of the populist Orbán. For example, he has not been a vocal proponent of gay rights, nor has he pledged support for Ukraine as it defends itself against the Russian invasion. And given his leanings, I do tend worry that he could be susceptible to influence from leaders like Vladimir Putin, and also Donald Trump.

Given his right of center tendencies (Magyar was once a Fidesz and Orbán loyalist) and his focus on revitalizing the Hungarian economy, I also don’t see him being especially friendly toward Ukraine; he needs energy from Russia after all. Likewise, I can’t imagine Hungary under Magyar throwing open the doors on immigration, though he will likely be more pragmatic on the issue rather than outright hostile. The same is true of Hungary’s relationship with the EU and Russia. For better or (usually) worse, Hungary depends on Russian resources (like natural gas) and investment; so, while Magyar may handle relations with the EU more strategically, he may end up — out of necessity — leaning toward a more Russia-friendly “Make Hungary Great Again” style of politics.

I remain hopeful (maybe even cautiously optimistic) that, if he wins today, Magyar will be a significant improvement over Orbán. However, history shows that Hungary’s leaders are often easily pushed around. (If you’re interested in learning more about the history of Hungary and its place on the national stage, I highly recommend the book Budapest: Portrait of a City Between East and West by Victor Sebestyen.)

The best way for a victorious Magyar to truly serve as a more legitimate conservative counterweight to Putin and Trump is for other moderate EU leaders to rally around him. If he becomes too progressive, he risks alienating a large portion of the population as Hungary generally leans more conservative than liberal. If he overcorrects and becomes too conservative, he opens the door to accusations that his campaign was just for show and, worse, invites external influence from rightwing authoritarians.

Success for Prime Minister Péter Magyar of the Tisza Party hinges on eliminating corruption, restoring Hungary’s democratic norms and adherence to the rule of law, and — most of all — striking a sensible middle path for the country.

The author enjoying Hungarian lángos in Budapest three weeks before the election.